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Alina Tryfonidou
THe Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples  
under European Law
1. Introduction
Few issues incite as much controversy in contemporary law and politics as the 
recognition and protection of the rights of sexual minorities. THe legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships, in particular, has, in the last couple of decades, become 
one of the most prominent issues discussed in parliaments, in courts, and in the 
media around the world, with views on both sides of the debate being overwhelm-
ingly strong and fraught with tension.1 THis is a complicated and sensitive matter 
which touches on issues relating to human rights, religion, morality, and tradition, 
as well as on constitutional principles such as equality, autonomy, and human 
dignity. Most religions and churches reject this move and are often vehemently 
opposed to it, considering homosexuality a “sin”, this leading, in turn, to negative 
societal attitudes towards lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) persons, especially in 
countries that are deeply religious.2
A much more controversial issue, nonetheless, is parenting by same-sex couples.3 
It is, of course, well-known that despite impressive advances in medicine and 
technology, same-sex couples are still incapable of having children who will be 
1 For literature on the legal recognition of same-sex relationships see, among others, K. Boele-
Woelki/A. Fuchs (eds.): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: National, 
Cross-Border and European Perspectives, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012; R. Wintemute/ 
M. Andenas (eds.): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European 
and International Law, Oxford: Hart, 2001; D. Gallo/L. Paladini/P. Pustorino (eds.): 
Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions, Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2014; A. Tryfonidou: “EU Free Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Relationships: THe Case for Mutual Recognition”, in: Columbia Journal of Euro-
pean Law 21 (2015), 195-248; D. Kochenov: “On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices 
of States: Gays and European Federalism”, in: Fordham International Law Journal 33 (2009), 
156-205; S. Titshaw: “Same-Sex Spouses Lost in Translation? How to Interpret ‘Spouse’ in 
the EU Family Migration Directives”, in: Boston University International Law Journal 34 
(2016), 45-112.
2 D.-J. Janssen/P. Scheepers: “How Religiosity Shapes Rejection of Homosexuality Across the 
Globe”, in: Journal of Homosexuality 66/14 (2018), 1-28.
3 See P. Dunne: “Who is a Parent and Who is a Child in a Same-Sex Family? – Legislative and 
Judicial Issues for LGBT Families Post-Separation, Part I: THe European Perspective”, in: 
Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 30 (2017), 27-54, at 31. 
A. Tryfonidou
177
genetically related to both members of the couple.4 Such couples can, however, 
become de facto joint parents in a number of ways, such as through donor insem-
ination (known or anonymous), assisted reproductive technologies, surrogacy, by 
becoming the joint parents of children from a prior relationship of one of the 
members of the couple (step-child adoption), or through adoption.5 THis means 
that in some situations, one of the members of the couple will be biologically 
connected to the child (e.g. when one of the female partners in a same-sex couple 
undergoes medically assisted procreation using her own egg or the egg of her 
partner), whilst in other situations (e.g. adoption or surrogacy used by a male 
same-sex couple with sperm donated from a third party) the child will be genet-
ically linked to neither member of the couple. Rainbow families (i.e. families 
comprised of a same-sex couple and their child[ren]), therefore, challenge some 
of the main assumptions that underpin the nuclear family ideal, namely, that a 
family is comprised of an opposite-sex couple and that its children are biological 
descendants of their primary caregivers.6
In terms of same-sex parenthood, the important legal question is whether, 
under a specific legal system, same-sex couples can be legally recognised as 
the joint parents of a child (either automatically or after taking specific steps 
[e.g. adoption]). THe aim of this article will be, exactly, to explore this question 
from the point of view of European law. “European law” is an umbrella term that 
covers the law produced by two separate – albeit closely interrelated – European 
organisations, namely, the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and the 
Council of Europe (with its flagship human rights instrument – the European 
4 It is true that in the last few years, so-called “three-parent babies” have been created with the 
use of a technique that mixes DNA from three persons. Nonetheless, so far, such techniques 
have only been used in situations where a woman has faulty mitochondria and, thus, needs 
those mitochondria to be exchanged with those of a healthy, unrelated, female egg donor in 
order to ensure that genetic diseases will not be passed from the mother to the child – see S. 
Reardon: “Genetic Details of Controversial ‘THree-Parent Baby’ Revealed”, in: Nature (2017), 
available at www.nature.com/news/genetic-details-of-controversial-three-parent-baby-revealed- 
1.21761 (accessed 28.08.2019); “UK Doctors Select First Women to Have ‘THree-Person Babies’”, 
in: THe Guardian (1 February 2018), available at www.theguardian.com/science/2018/feb/01/
permission-given-to-create-britains-first-three-person-babies (accessed 28.08.2019). For an argu-
ment that this technique should be extended to allow same-sex couples comprised of two women 
to have a child that is genetically related to both parents see G. Cavaliere/C. Palacios- 
González: “Lesbian Motherhood and Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques: Reproductive 
Freedom of Genetic Kinship”, in: Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (2018), 835-842. In addition, 
recent experiments with mice have shown that synthetic sperm and eggs can be created using 
stem cell technology, which can, potentially, enable same-sex couples to have children who 
are biologically related to both members of the couple – see, for instance, “Artificial Sperm 
and Wombs Offer New Means of Reproduction”, in: Financial Times (8 December 2017), 
available at www.ft.com/content/0f9b51d6-c565-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab (accessed 29.08.2019).
5 For a clear explanation of these options see T. Amos/J. Rainer: “Parenthood for Same-Sex 
Couples in the European Union: Key Challenges”, in: K. Boele-Woelki/A. Fuchs (eds.): 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, 79-122.
6 See J.-H. Déchaux: “THe Challenges of the New Reproductive Technologies: How Kinship 
Enters Politics”, in: B. Feuillet-Liger/T. Callus/K. Orfali (eds.): Reproductive Technology 
and Changing Perceptions of Parenthood around the World, Brussels: Bruylant, 2014, 311-332.
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Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]), on the other. As will be explained 
subsequently in this article, the lack of guidance at European level means that 
the parental rights that same-sex couples enjoy at the national level vary consider-
ably throughout Europe. THe most recent edition of ILGA Europe’s Rainbow 
map7 demonstrates that only a minority of European states provide full parental 
rights to same-sex couples, reflecting “the idea that in order to thrive a child needs 
two parents of different sex who are in a committed relationship”.8 However, are 
European states allowed – under the ECHR and EU law – to continue to refuse 
parental rights to same-sex couples? THis is the question that this article will aim 
to answer. For this purpose, a simple structure will be followed, exploring this 
question, firstly, from the point of view of the ECHR and, secondly, under EU 
law.
2. Parenting Rights for Same-Sex Couples under the ECHR
THe Council of Europe is a supranational organisation that was established in 
1949, from the ashes of the destruction caused by the Second World War. It is 
considered the continent’s leading human rights organisation, which, at the 
moment, includes 47 European countries as its member states. All Council of 
Europe states have signed and ratified the ECHR, which is a treaty designed to 
protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, whilst the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) which is based in Strasbourg, oversees its implemen-
tation.9
THe Council of Europe has a diverse membership and includes states at both 
ends of the spectrum of LGB egalitarianism. Eastern European countries offer 
very limited, if any, protection to LGB persons and their families, whilst (the 
majority) of the Western European countries are pioneers in this field. Eastern 
European countries, in fact, often view issues concerning sexual minorities as an 
imposition of “Western values”, which may clash with their norms and values 
which, allegedly, are more attached to tradition, religion, and the (nuclear) family 
as the foundation of society.10 In such Eastern European countries where social 
7 See ILGA Europe Rainbow Europe Package: Annual Review and Rainbow Europe Map, 
available at www.ilga-europe.org/rainboweurope/2019 (accessed on 28.08.2019).
8 N. Nikolina: “Evolution of Parenting Rights in Europe – a Comparative Case Study about 
Questions in Section 3 of the LawsAndFamilies Database”, in: K. Waaldijk: More and More 
Together: Legal Family Formats for Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples in European Countries: 
Comparative Analysis of Data in the LawsAndFamilies Database, Working Paper 75 (2017), 
available at openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/54628/Waaldijk%20-%20More%20
and%20more%20together%20-%20FamiliesAndSocietiesWorkingPaper%2075%282017%29.
pdf?sequence=3 (accessed 28.08.2019), 102.
9 For an analysis of the ECHR see B. Rainey/E. Wicks/C. Ovey: Jacobs, White and Ovey: 
THe European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
10 P. Ayoub/D. Paternotte: “Europe and LGBT Rights: A Conflicted Relationship”, in: 
M. Bosia/S.M. McEvoy/M. Rahman (eds.): THe Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and 
Sexual Diversity Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
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change has not yet been achieved and there is, still, widespread homophobia, 
political leaders have, often, gained political capital by publicly displaying 
 homophobia and marginalising sexual minorities with calls to “the defence of 
the nation”.11 In addition, these countries often have high levels of religiosity, 
and thus the actions and rhetoric of religious institutions act as powerful counter-
mobilisers against LGB rights.12
THis lack of homogeneity in the Council of Europe’s membership affects the 
organisation’s stance on the protection of the rights of sexual minorities: although 
the ECHR has, since the 1980s, been interpreted by the ECtHR in a way which 
recognises that LGB persons – as human beings – enjoy all the rights laid down 
under this instrument, the protection afforded to them mainly constitutes 
a  compromise position, which ensures that it will not cause the fervent objection 
of the member states. In particular, although the Strasbourg Court has made it 
clear, for instance, that all Council of Europe member states must decriminalise 
same-sex sexual activities between consenting adults,13 and must provide an equal 
age of consent for same-sex and opposite-sex couples,14 it has been more reluctant 
to impose obligations in the family law field, whereby it leaves a wide margin of 
appreciation to its signatory states. As noted by the ECtHR in its judgment in 
Alekseyev v. Russia, “there remain issues where no European consensus has been 
reached, such as granting permission to same-sex couples to adopt a child…and 
the right to marry, and the Court has confirmed the domestic authorities’ wide 
margin of appreciation in respect of those issues”.15
Within the ECHR, the family is a protected institution. Article 8 ECHR 
provides that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence”, whilst article 12 ECHR provides that “men and 
women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, accord-
ing to the national laws governing the exercise of this right”.
But what constitutes a “family” for the purposes of the ECHR? THe nuclear 
family, consisting of different-sex married spouses and their biologically-linked 
children, was never the only form of family that existed, though, it is still 
“the gold standard against which all other family types are assessed”.16 Nonethe-
less, “the family” is a flexible and adaptable unit, and recent years have seen an 
11 R.C.M. Mole: “Nationalism and Homophobia in Central and Eastern Europe”, in: 
K. Slootmaeckers/H. Touquet/P. Vermeersch (eds.): THe EU Enlargement and Gay Politics: 
THe Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice, London: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, 2016.
12 A. Adamczyk/C. Pitt: “Shaping Attitudes about Homosexuality: THe Role of Religion and 
Cultural Context”, in: Social Science Research 38/2 (2009), 338-351.
13 App 7525/76, Dudgeon v. UK, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 Octo-
ber 1981, [1982] 4 EHRR 149; App 10581/83, Norris v. Ireland, Judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 26 October 1988, [1989] 13 EHRR 186; App 15070/89 Modinos v. Cyprus, 
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 April 1993, [1993] 16 EHRR 485.
14 App 25186/94, Sutherland v. UK, Report of the European Court of Human Rights, 1 July 1997.
15 Alekseyev v. Russia, Application nos 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, 21 October 2010, para. 83.
16 S. Golombok: Modern Families: Parents and Children in New Family Forms, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, 4. See, also, A. Singer: “THe Right of the Child to Parents”, 
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increase in alternative families, many families now consisting of (unmarried) 
cohabitants and their children, children and their parents and step-parents, 
 children and their single parent, and children and their same-sex parents.17 THe 
law, therefore, not only needs to recognise such alternative families18 but also to 
provide a system that is sensitive and responsive to their own specific needs.19
Taking this into account, the ECtHR held, for the first time in 2012, in Gas 
and Dubois v. France, that a same-sex couple and their child(ren) can together 
enjoy “family life”, within the meaning of article 8 ECHR.20 THis means that the 
fact that (at least) one of the parents is not biologically linked to the child of the 
family does not disqualify the parents and the child from constituting a “family”. 
THis follows the general approach of the ECtHR, according to which biological 
ties are not an overriding factor in establishing family life, and what is important 
in all cases is whether there is evidence of a real and constant relationship among 
the members of the family.21 Accordingly, once a rainbow family qualifies as 
a “family” for the purposes of the ECHR, it can enjoy the protection offered to 
all families, subject, of course, to interferences which are in accordance with the 
law and necessary on a number of grounds.
However, what happens when a same-sex couple wishes to have a child together? 
Does the ECHR give the right to same-sex couples to “found” a family by requir-
ing all signatory states to allow them de facto to have a child and by making 
provision for both members of the couple to be legally recognised as the parents 
of the child?
THe ECtHR is of the view that it is up to the ECHR signatory states to 
determine whether they will allow single persons and different types of couples 
to “found a family” and to choose in what ways they can do so (e.g. through 
adoption or surrogacy). For instance, in EB v. France, the ECtHR noted that 
“the provisions of Article 8 do not guarantee either the right to found a family 
or the right to adopt…THe right to respect for ‘family life’ does not safeguard the 
mere desire to found a family.”22 Accordingly, it is not possible for anyone – 
including a same-sex couple – to rely on article 8 ECHR to require a signatory 
in: K. Boele-Woelki/A. Fuchs (eds.): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, 
137-138.
17 S. Golombok: Modern Families, 3.
18 C. McGlynn: Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, 39-41 and Chapters 4 and 5; L. Gonzalez: “‘With Liberty 
and Justice for All (Families)’: THe Modern American Same-Sex Family”, in: St. THomas Law 
Review 23 (2011), 293-322.
19 A. Bainham: “Family Law in a Pluralistic Society”, in: Journal of Law and Society 22 (1995), 
234-247.
20 Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25952/07, 2012, para. 37. See, also, X and Others v. Austria, 
no. 19010/07, 2013), paras 95-96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11 (case 
declared inadmissible), para. 27.
21 J.R.M. v. the Netherlands, no. 16944/90, 1993; Nylund v. Finland, no. 27110/95, 1999; K. and 
T. v. Finland, no. 25702/94, 2001. See G. Van Bueren: Child Rights in Europe, Paris: 
 Council of Europe Publishing, 2007, 119.
22 EB v. France, no. 43546/02, 2008, para. 41.
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state to provide parental rights to persons or couples which it has chosen to 
exclude from this right.
However, when signatory states decide which persons or couples are entitled 
to the right to found a family, they must do so without discrimination on any 
of the grounds prohibited under article 14 ECHR, including on the ground of 
sexual orientation. THus, if a signatory state decides to allow single persons to 
found a family, it must do so in a way which is not discriminatory on any of 
the article 14 grounds: in EB v. France,23 the ECtHR held that a restriction on 
the right to adopt by a single woman based on the fact that she was a lesbian, 
amounted to unjustified discriminatory treatment based on sexual orientation 
which, as such, was contrary to article 14 ECHR read together with article 8 
ECHR.24
As regards parenting rights by same-sex couples, if a signatory state which has 
not opened marriage to same-sex couples reserves the right to become the joint 
parents of a child to married couples this – according to the ECtHR – is not 
contrary to the ECHR, despite the fact that it, in effect, means that same-sex 
couples are excluded from the right to jointly parent their child as they will not 
both be legally recognised as the parents of the child. Gas and Dubois v. France25 
involved two women who had entered into a French PACS and had a child 
through assisted reproduction. Since France did not – and, still, does not – allow 
women who are in a same-sex relationship to have a child through assisted repro-
duction, the child was recognised under French law as only the child of the birth 
mother. When the other mother sought to be legally recognised as the second 
parent of the child through a second-parent adoption, this was refused by the 
French authorities, on the ground that the two women were not married (at the 
time, same-sex couples in France could only enter into a PACS, as marriage was 
only open to opposite-sex couples). THe ECtHR held that the contested refusal 
was not discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation, as the applicants’ 
situation was not comparable to that of married (opposite-sex) couples – who 
could proceed with a second-parent adoption – whilst it was comparable to that 
of unmarried opposite-sex couples who were, also, under French law, refused the 
right to second-parent adoption. In the subsequent case of X and Others v. 
Austria,26 this approach was confirmed when the court held that a signatory state 
was not allowed to refuse a second-parent adoption to an unmarried same-sex 
couple – on the basis that it was unmarried – if its legislation allowed second-
parent adoptions by married heterosexual couples but also by unmarried opposite-
sex couples. THis was because this amounted to discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation as regards the enjoyment of the right to private and family life, 
23 Ibid.
24 See, however, the different result in the earlier judgment in Fretté v. France, Application 
no. 36515/97, ECHR 2002-I, which seems to have been overturned by EB v. France (n. 22).
25 Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25952/07, 2012, para. 37.
26 Ibid.
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because unmarried opposite-sex couples were similarly situated with unmarried 
same-sex couples; hence, it was contrary to articles 14 and 8 ECHR. 27
As can be noted from the above rulings, in all instances, it is the familial tie 
between the child and the non-biological parent that needs to be positively legally 
established. THis is because, since the 1970s, the ECtHR has required signatory 
states to make provision for the automatic legal recognition of the familial tie 
between a child and his/her biological parent. In Marckx v. Belgium,28 it was held 
that article 8 “implies the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render 
possible as from the moment of birth the child’s integration in his [biological] 
family”.29 Similarly, in Johnston v. Ireland, 30 the ECtHR found Ireland to be in 
breach of the right to family life of a child and her (biological) parents, as a result 
of the fact that the child’s natural family ties to her (biological) father could not 
be legally recognised because her parents could not marry on account of the 
indissolubility – due to the Irish constitutional prohibition on divorce at the time 
– of the father’s marriage to another woman from whom he had separated.
So far, this section has examined the situation of rainbow families where the 
parent-child relationship needs to be legally established ab initio. What happens, 
however, when the parent-child relationship between the child and both of his/
her same-sex parents has been legally established in one country and the family 
then seeks to have the familial links among its members to continue to be legally 
recognised in another country. Is the refusal of the latter country to recognise the 
relationship between the child and one or both of the parents – as this has been 
established in the first country – a breach of the ECHR?
Following Gas and Dubois v. France,31 in situations where the child in a rain-
bow family has established de facto “family ties” with both of his/her parents, it 
is undisputed that family life exists between the members of the family; and, 
a fortiori, this is the case when those family ties have, already, been legally recog-
nised somewhere. Accordingly, the question is whether the dissolution of the legal 
links between a child and both or one parent in another country amount to 
a breach of article 8 ECHR. THis question has already been considered by the 
ECtHR, albeit in cases which did not involve rainbow families.
In Wagner v. Luxembourg,32 at issue was the refusal of the Luxembourg author-
ities to recognise the Peruvian court decision pronouncing the full adoption by 
Ms Wagner – a Luxembourg national – of her child, JMWL, of Peruvian nation-
ality. THe refusal was the result of the absence in the Luxembourg legislation 
of provisions allowing an unmarried person to obtain full adoption of a child. 
27 For a discussion of these cases see D.A. Gonzalez-Salzberg: Sexuality and Transsexuality 
under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Queer Reading of Human Rights Law, 
Oxford: Hart, 2019, 150-154.
28 Marckx v. Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979).
29 Ibid., para. 31.
30 Johnston v. Ireland, no 9697/82, 1986. 
31 Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25952/07, 2012, para. 37.
32 Wagner v. Luxembourg App no 76240/01 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007).
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THe ECtHR held that this refusal amounted to an unjustified interference with 
the right to respect for Ms Wagner’s and her child’s family life and, thus, amounted 
to an infringement of article 8 ECHR. THe court, in particular, noted that 
“bearing in mind that the best interests of the child are paramount in such a 
case…the Court considers that the Luxembourg court could not reasonably 
disregard the legal status validly created abroad and corresponding to a family life 
within the meaning of art 8 of the Convention”.33 
THe case, therefore, demonstrates that article 8 ECHR requires the contracting 
states to pursue the cross-border continuity of family ties and, thus, “‘limping’ 
situations – i.e. situations where a personal status is recognized under the law 
of State X but not under the law of State Y – should be avoided to the largest 
possible extent”.34 And as is obvious from the facts of the case, this applies 
irrespective of whether the child and the parent(s) are genetically linked.
More recently, the ECtHR was called to rule in a case which involved the 
cross-border recognition of a parent-child relationship lawfully established 
abroad, albeit in the more controversial context of a surrogacy arrangement 
(Mennesson v. France).35 THe ECtHR, following the principles established in 
Wagner v. Luxembourg, found that the contested refusal of France to recognise 
a surrogacy agreement entered into in the US, and the resultant refusal to legally 
recognise the parent-child relationship as legally recognised in that country, 
amounted to a breach of article 8 ECHR. However, unlike in Wagner, in this 
case, the ECtHR found that there was a breach of article 8 ECHR as regards 
the children’s right to private life only. In particular, the court found that, 
on the facts of the case, the lack of recognition of the parent-child relationship 
did not disproportionally affect the applicants’ ability to enjoy their family life 
in a practical sense, and, thus, did not amount to a breach of their right to 
family life. THere was, nonetheless, a breach of the right to private life of the 
children, since “respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to 
establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes 
the legal parent-child relationship”;36 the “legal uncertainty” caused as a result 
of the non-recognition in the host state is liable to have negative repercussions 
on the children’s definition of their personal identity. More recently, the ECtHR 
made it clear37 that in such cases the right to respect for private life requires that 
domestic law provides a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relation-
ship established abroad, not only between the children and the intended parent 
33 Ibid., para 133. See, also, Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece App no 56759/09 (ECtHR, 3 May 
2011).
34 P. Franzina: “Some Remarks on the Relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR to the Recognition 
of Family Status Judicially Created Abroad”, in: Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 5/3 (2011), 
609-616, at 611.
35 App no 65192/11 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014). See, also, Labassee v. France App no 65941/11 (ECtHR, 
26 June 2014) and Laborie v. France App no 44024/13 (ECtHR, 19 January 2017). 
36 Mennesson v. France (n. 35), para 96.
37 ECtHR Advisory Opinion Request No P16-2018-001 (10 April 2019).
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who is biologically linked to them but, also, with the intended (non-biologically 
related) mother, designated in the birth certificate legally established abroad 
as the “legal mother”. 
Accordingly, relying on the above authorities, rainbow families can claim that 
ECHR signatory states interfere with the enjoyment of the right to private 
and family life of both the parents and the child when they refuse to pursue the 
cross-border continuity of the family ties, both between the child and the bio-
logical parent (in case one of the parents is biologically related to the child) as 
well as between the child and the non-biological parent.38
THe right to private and family life is, nonetheless, not an absolute right, and 
states are allowed to justify their measures which interfere with its exercise, pro-
vided that the interference is “in accordance with the law”, furthers a legitimate 
aim of those mentioned in article 8(2) ECHR,39 and is necessary in a democratic 
society.
Given that it is fairly clear and foreseeable that states which do not recognise 
rainbow families will fail to recognise them also in situations which involve a cross-
border element, the interference can be considered to be in accordance with 
the law. However, can the contested refusal be justified by the “legitimate aims” 
laid down in article 8 ECHR? States would most likely argue that their refusal 
to legally recognise the family ties among the members of rainbow families 
 coming from other countries has two aims: the “protection of morals” – with the 
specific aim of supporting and encouraging the family in the traditional sense 
which “is, in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason”40 – as well as “the protec-
tion of the rights of others”, in this case, “others” being read as referring to 
“children”.
38 In situations where the host member state refuses to recognise the parental ties between 
a child of a same-sex couple and both of his/her parents, as these have been legally established 
elsewhere, this is clearly done because the parents of the child are of the same sex. In other 
words, member states which do not allow a same-sex couple to legally establish a family in 
their territory, and which do not allow a rainbow family lawfully established elsewhere to be 
recognised as such, do so for the simple reason that the couple that is founding the family is 
comprised of two persons of the same sex. If the parents of the child were an opposite-sex 
couple, in the vast majority of cases they would both be legally recognised as the parents of 
the child, even if the child was adopted or was conceived via assisted procreation methods. 
THis can clearly amount to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation as regards the 
enjoyment of the right to private and family life and can, thus, amount to a violation of 
article 14 ECHR read together with article 8 ECHR. Article 14 ECHR prohibits discrimina-
tion as regards the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR which is 
based on a number of grounds. Although “sexual orientation” is not mentioned expressly 
among the grounds laid down in this provision, the ECtHR made it clear that the term “other 
status” includes sexual orientation. THe same analysis as to why such a breach of the ECHR 
in this context cannot be justified as provided subsequently in the main text regarding a breach 
of the right to private and family life can be applied in this context as well.
39 THese are national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection of the rights of 
others.
40 Karner v. Austria App no 40016/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003), para 40.
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THe aim of supporting and encouraging the traditional family has been recog-
nised as a valid objective by the ECtHR.41 However, such a justification would 
most likely fail, because – to use the reasoning employed in Marckx v. Belgium 
– “in the achievement of this end recourse must not be had to measures whose 
object or result is…to prejudice the” rainbow family, given that the members of 
the rainbow family can – as established in Gas and Dubois v. France – constitute 
a “family” and, thus, can enjoy family life. Accordingly, the members of rainbow 
families who enjoy family life must “enjoy the guarantees of art 8 on an equal 
footing with the members of the traditional family”.42
Moreover, as another commentator has rightly argued,43 the standard “tradi-
tional family” defence would suggest that, by reducing non-heterosexual family 
rights to the greatest extent possible, national laws disincentivize non-traditional 
family structures, prioritize heterosexual marriage relationships, and encourage 
individuals into a socially optimal family model. However, such an argument 
would be intellectually weak (not to mention wholly removed from social reality). 
Severing the legal connection between gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents and their 
non-biological children does not persuade such individuals to enter an opposite-
gender heterosexual marriage.
In any event, even if the above aim could, at first glance, seem capable of 
justifying the interference towards the rights to private and family life in this 
context, it is unlikely to be found proportionate. THe ECtHR has noted that 
“the fact that an essential aspect of the identity of individuals is at stake where 
the legal parent-child relationship is concerned” means that the margin of appre-
ciation afforded to states needs to be reduced.44 And, as the same court has 
stressed,45 in cases where the margin of appreciation afforded to states is narrow, 
“the principle of proportionality does not merely require that the measure chosen 
is in principle suited for realising the aim sought. It must also be shown that it 
was necessary in order to achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people” 
from a certain entitlement. For the reasons explained above, it cannot be shown 
that it is necessary, in order to protect the family in the traditional sense, 
to deprive the children of rainbow families and their parents of the entitlement 
to have their relationship – as established elsewhere – legally recognised in the 
member state to which they move.
41 See, for instance, Vallianatos v. Greece App nos 29381/09 and 32684/09 (ECtHR, 7 November 
2013), para 83. 
42 Marckx v. Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), para 40.
43 P. Dunne: “Who is a Parent and Who is a Child in a Same-Sex Family?”, 48-49. See, also, 
J.M. Scherpe: “THe Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe and the Role of the 
European Court of Human Rights”, in: THe Equal Rights Review 10 (2013), 83-96, 92; and 
N. Polikoff: “THis Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families”, in: Georgetown 
Law Journal 78 (1990), 459-575, 486.
44 See, for instance, Mennesson v. France (n. 35) paras 77 and 80; Orlandi and Others v. Italy App 
Nos 26431/12, 26742/12; 44057/12 and 60088/12 (ECtHR, 14 December 2017) para 203. 
45 Karner (n. 40) para. 41. 
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For similar reasons, a justification based on the need to protect the rights of 
others, namely the rights of the children of rainbow families, would also be bound 
to fail. THere has been considerable social, scientific, and psychological research 
which argues that the successful raising of a child is not dependent upon the 
sexual orientation of his or her parents.46 Moreover, the ECtHR has pointed out 
in its case-law that “there is currently a broad consensus – including in interna-
tional law – in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their 
best interests must be paramount” and has made a reference to the importance 
of the right of the child to maintain a personal relationship and direct contact 
with both his/her parents.47 THe same court has also noted that “family ties may 
only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be 
done to preserve personal relations”.48 Accordingly, the best interests of the child 
seem to require that the familial ties (s)he has legally established with his/her 
parents in one country should be maintained when the family finds itself in 
another country. Same-sex couples should, therefore, continue to be legally rec-
ognised as the joint parents of their children in a second state, not despite the 
children’s best interests, but exactly because this is required, if the children’s best 
interests are taken into account.49
THe preceding analysis demonstrates that the ECtHR has been reluctant to 
impose an obligation on ECHR signatory states to allow same-sex couples to 
become and be legally recognised as the joint parents of children. Nonetheless, 
as has already been made clear in a number of ECtHR rulings involving rainbow 
families, although the ECHR does not impose an obligation on its signatory 
states to allow specific types of persons or couples to found a family, nonetheless, 
when choosing the categories of persons or couples who can have a child and be 
legally recognised as the parents of that child, they must do so in a way which 
does not discriminate on the grounds prohibited by article 14 ECHR, which 
include sexual orientation. Hence, although ECHR signatory states are not obliged 
to extend parenting rights to same-sex couples, they can refrain from doing so 
only if they do not extend such rights also to opposite-sex couples who are 
similarly situated (e.g. if unmarried couples cannot be recognised as the joint 
legal parents of a child, this must be the case for both opposite-sex and same-sex 
couples unmarried couples). On the other hand, ECtHR case-law on the cross-
border legal recognition of the parent-child relationship can be relied on by 
rainbow families to require ECHR signatory states to legally recognise the famil-
ial ties among the members of such families as these have been legally established 
46 See, most fundamentally, S. Golombok: Modern Families, esp. chapters 2 and 7; American 
Psychological Association: “Sexual Orientation, Parents, & Children” (2004), available at 
www.apa.org/about/policy/parenting.aspx (accessed 28.08.2019); N. Gartrell/H. Bos/A. 
Koh: “National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study – Mental Health of Adult Offspring”, 
in: THe New England Journal of Medicine 379 (2018), 297-299.
47 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland App no 41615/07 (6 July 2010), para 135.
48 Ibid., para 136.
49 C. McGlynn: Families and the European Union, 108. 
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in another country. THis can prove particularly helpful for rainbow families as, 
in many instances, for legal (more permissive legal system) or financial (less costly) 
reasons, same-sex couples choose or need to have a child in a country where they 
do not plan to live in the long term and subsequently move back to their coun-
try of origin where they need to (continue to) be recognised jointly as the legal 
parents of that child.
3. Parenting Rights for Same-Sex Couples Under EU Law
What is today the EU was originally founded in the 1950s, in the form of three 
economically-oriented Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom).50 THe first of these Communities (the ECSC) 
was founded in 1952, i.e. just three years after the foundation of the Council of 
Europe and – like the latter – was a(nother) response to the destruction brought 
by the Second World War. THe long-term objective behind the foundation of the 
three Communities in the 1950s, was, thus, the desire for peace in Europe: the 
rationale was that the proposed cooperation in economic matters would make 
the participating states economically interdependent but would, also, bring them 
closer together, in this way averting another war in the continent. Accordingly, 
back in the 1950s, when the three Communities were established, their main aim 
was to build an internal market where goods and people could move freely between 
the participating countries. In 1993, the three Communities were subsumed into 
the newly-founded Union – the European Union – and the aims of the organisa-
tion expanded beyond the economic sphere.51 THis led – by the end of the 1990s 
– to a union which had added the protection of fundamental human rights to 
its core values,52 whilst a single treaty provision included in the founding treaties 
which merely required that men and women should be paid equally for work of 
equal value,53 had fully blossomed into a successful EU antidiscrimination policy, 
seeking to eradicate discrimination on a wider range of grounds, including 
 discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. However, what has the posi-
tion of LGB persons been under EU law?
In the EU, the first, tentative, steps towards the formation of an organised 
lesbian and gay liberation political movement were taken in the 1970s, following 
the Stonewall Riots in New York in 1969.54 Nonetheless, it took this political 
movement almost three decades before its efforts had begun to come to fruition. 
50 For more on the history of the EU see L. Van Middelaar: THe Passage to Europe: How 
a Continent Became a Union, New Haven, CT-London: Yale University Press, 2014.
51 M. Holland: European Integration from Community to Union, London: Pinter, 1993.
52 Now found in article 2 TEU.
53 THis is the current article 157 TFEU.
54 For an account of the Stonewall Riots see D. Carter: Stonewall: THe Riots that Sparked the 
Gay Revolution, New York: St Martin’s Press, 2004. For an excellent account of the history of 
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At first, EU law came empty-handed for persons with non-heterosexual sexualities 
as, until 1999, there was no binding EU legal instrument which either explicitly 
or implicitly protected their rights.55 Moreover, the EU’s top court – the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) – appeared reticent (to put it mildly) in the first two cases 
where claims were brought by LGB persons claiming that they suffered dis-
crimination by their employer because of their sexual orientation: it held that EU 
law did not, at the time, prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
whilst same-sex relationships were not considered equivalent to opposite-sex 
 marriages or relationships outside marriage and, thus, the entitlements granted 
to persons who were in an opposite-sex marriage or relationship did not have to 
be extended to persons who were in a same-sex relationship.56
Nonetheless, the gradual transformation of EU anti-discrimination law from 
initially a tool in the process of creating an internal market to a human rights 
instrument had, clearly, contributed to the protection of sexual minorities from 
discrimination under EU law.57 THe foundations for this were laid in 1999, with 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced a new legal 
basis – what is now article 19 TFEU – which gave competence to the EU to make 
legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sex, racial, or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.58 THis provision – which made 
the EC treaty the first international agreement to explicitly make reference to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation – is what formed the legal basis for 
Directive 2000/78, which is still in force today and prohibits discrimination on 
a number of grounds, including sexual orientation, albeit only in the employment 
field.59 Since 2009, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation outside 
the employment field is also prohibited by EU law, under article 21 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. THe 2000 Directive and article 21 EUCFR have 
been interpreted by the ECJ in rulings which give mixed signals regarding the 
EU judiciary’s commitment to the protection of the rights of LGB persons.60
the gay rights movement in the US see L. Faderman: THe Gay Revolution: THe Story of the 
Struggle, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015.
55 A. Tryfonidou: “THe Impact of the Framework Equality Directive on the Protection of LGB 
Persons and Same-Sex Couples from Discrimination under EU Law”, in: U. Belavusau/ 
K. Henrard (eds.): EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender, Oxford: Hart, 2018, 231-232.
56 Case C-249/96 Grant EU:C:1998:63; Joined Cases C-122 and 125/99 P D and Sweden v. 
Council EU:C:2001:304.
57 A. Tryfonidou: “Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, 
in: S. Vogenauer/S. Weatherill (eds.): General Principles of Law: European and Comparative 
Perspectives, Oxford: Hart, 2017, 365-394.
58 For an analysis on the steps that led to the introduction of this provision see M. Bell/ 
L. Waddington: “THe 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Prospects of a Non-
Discrimination Treaty Article”, in: Industrial Law Journal 25 (1996), 320-336.
59 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation [2000] OJ L 180/22.
60 See, for instance, Case C-81/12 Asociaţia Accept EU:C:2013:275; Case C-528/13 Léger 




THe aim of this section of the article, nonetheless, is not to consider the extent 
to which EU law protects LGB rights; rather, the article has a more specific aim, 
namely, to consider what has been the EU’s stance on parenting by same-sex 
couples.
It should be noted that, in the EU context, there has been no case to date 
before the ECJ (or a national court61) whereby a rainbow family sought to rely 
on EU law to challenge the choices of an EU member state with regards to this 
matter. Accordingly, the analysis that will follow will aim to demonstrate what 
should be held should such a challenge emerge in the future.
Like in the ECHR context, the starting point here should be that family 
law is considered to be an area that EU member states maintain their exclusive 
competence, and thus the EU does not have competence to act. Hence, although 
the EU includes among its member states some of the pioneering countries 
in terms of LGB egalitarianism, it cannot require all its 28 members to open 
marriage or any other legally recognised relationship status to same-sex couples, 
and it cannot require them to allow same-sex couples to found a family and to 
be legally recognised (ab initio) as the joint parents of a child.62
Nonetheless, it is a well-established principle of EU law that even though the 
EU cannot interfere in areas that fall within the exclusive competence of its 
member states – such as in the area of family law – when the member states act 
in those areas, they have to comply with their obligations under EU law.63 Put 
simply, this means that when they make choices and they legislate in the family 
law field, member states must ensure that they do not violate EU law.
Hence, when EU member states decide whether they will legally recognise the 
parent-child relationship in situations involving rainbow families, they must ensure 
that their decision does not violate EU law. THe determination of an EU member 
state as to whether or not it will allow same-sex couples to legally establish 
a  family in their territory by being legally recognised as the joint parents of 
a child (ab initio), does not seem to have any connection with the aims or 
 policies of the EU; accordingly, EU law does not require EU member states to 
allow same-sex couples in their territory to become the de facto joint parents of 
a child, nor does it require them to enable the parents of a child to be recognised 
legally (ab initio) as the parents of the child. THis is why the parental rights 
that same-sex couples enjoy at the national level vary considerably throughout 
the EU (as is the case, more broadly, in Europe at large, as was seen in the 
 previous section). 
61 In most instances, EU law is enforced through private enforcement actions by individuals 
before national courts which is made possible by the doctrine of direct effect, established 
judicially in 1963 – for an explanation of direct effect see R. Schütze: European Union Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
62 For cases where the ECJ has made it clear that EU law cannot require EU member states to 
provide legal recognition to same-sex relationships see, inter alia, Case C-267/06 Maruko 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para 59; Parris (n. 60) para 59.
63 See, for instance, Parris (n. 60) para 58.
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Nonetheless, a clear possibility of a clash between EU law and an EU member 
state’s stance on the matter can emerge in situations where the latter refuses to 
legally recognise the parent-child relationship between a child and both of his/
her (same-sex) parents, as this has been established in another country. THe legal 
basis for challenging this refusal is twofold (the EU free movement provisions 
and EU fundamental human rights protection). THe article will, therefore, now 
explore each of these two legal bases and the arguments that can be made by 
rainbow families in this context.
3.1 EU Free Movement Law
EU member state nationals derive from the free movement of persons provi-
sions which are found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the right to move freely between EU member states and to reside in the 
member state of their choice.64 THey also derive a number of secondary rights, the 
grant of which has been considered necessary for enabling them to exercise the 
above, primary, right.65 One such secondary right is the so-called right to family 
reunification which enables member state nationals who exercise free movement 
rights to be accompanied or joined by their close family members in the EU 
member state to which they move.66 THis right has been laid down in secondary 
EU legislation since the 1960s, and is currently found in Directive 2004/38.67 In 
order for family reunification rights to be meaningful, they are supplemented by 
a number of additional rights which have as their aim to ensure that the family 
can become integrated into the society of the host member state, after it is admit-
ted to its territory. Examples of such rights are the right of the family members 
to work in the host member state,68 and the right of the “sponsor” member state 
national and the family members to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of 
the host member state in situations which fall within the scope of EU law.69 THe 
rationale behind the grant of family reunification (and related) rights has, simply, 
been to ensure that Union citizens will not be deterred from exercising their EU 
free movement rights: if the host member state was allowed to refuse to accept 
64 THe free movement of persons provisions are, currently, art 45 TFEU (workers), art 49 TFEU 
(the self-employed), art 56 TFEU (service providers/recipients), and art 21 TFEU, which is 
the catch-all, lex generalis, provision which applies to all Union citizens. According to article 
20 TFEU, every EU member state national is, automatically, a Union citizen.
65 For an explanation of the distinction between primary and secondary rights in EU free move-
ment law see A. Tryfonidou: THe Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms, 
Oxford: Hart, 2016, 21-22.
66 For an analysis of the family reunification rights that member state nationals derive from EU 
law see C. Berneri: Family Reunification in the EU: THe Movement and Residence of THird 
Country National Family Members of EU Citizens, Oxford: Hart, 2017.
67 Council and Parliament Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states [2004] 
OJ L 158/77.
68 Ibid., article 23.
69 Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 (n. 67).
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their close family members, and to facilitate the integration of the family, in its 
territory then the member state national might decide not to move at all and in 
this way the exercise of EU free movement rights would be restricted.
If this rationale is transposed into the rainbow families context, where a child 
is a member state national and (s)he is not allowed to be accompanied or joined 
by both of her parents in the host state – because the legal links between the 
members of the family, as legally established elsewhere, are not recognised in 
the host state – the child’s right to move and reside in the territory of another 
EU member state will be breached.70 Similarly, in situations where, for the same 
reason, a member state national cannot be accompanied or joined by his/her 
children in the host EU member state, (s)he will be deterred from exercising free 
movement rights.71 Now, assuming that a rainbow family is actually admitted 
to the host member state, this is not the end of the story. If that state does not 
legally recognise the family ties between the members of the family for other legal 
purposes (e.g. tax law, property law, inheritance law, nationality law, pensions, 
hospital and school visits, and so on) this will cause great inconvenience to the 
members of the family which, in its turn, will impede the exercise of their free 
movement rights.72
Accordingly, the refusal of the host EU member state to legally recognise 
the familial ties already enjoyed by the members of a rainbow family moving to 
its territory from another member state can amount to a breach of the EU free 
movement of persons. THis is the case when the above failure leads to the refusal 
of family reunification rights or of other entitlements which the family seeks to 
claim once it has been admitted into the territory of the host member state.73
3.2 EU Fundamental Human Rights Protection
Under EU law, fundamental human rights have been protected as part of the 
general principles of EU law since the late 1960s.74 With the coming into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) has been 
amended, and its article 6 now provides that the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EUCFR) has the same legal value as the treaties. Hence, in the EU, there 
are currently two parallel sources of fundamental human rights protection: the 
EUCFR and the general principles of EU law.75 
70 See, for instance, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen ECLI:EU:C:2004:639.
71 See, for instance, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R ECLI:EU:C:2002:493.
72 Here, the argument made by the ECJ in a different context (the cross-border recognition of 
surnames) is employed: Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello ECLI:EU:C:2003:539.
73 Such an obstacle to free movement is unlikely to be justified (on the grounds of public policy 
or the need to preserve their national identity, which are laid down in articles 45[3] TFEU 
and 52 TFEU) as the measure is not based on the personal conduct of the individual(s) 
 concerned, as required by art 27(2) of Directive 2004/38 (n. 67).
74 Case 29/69 Stauder ECLI:EU:C:1969:57.
75 For an analysis of the development of the EU human rights policy see R. Schütze: European 
Union Law, Chapter 12.
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Although the ECHR is not an EU instrument, it has, nonetheless, always had 
a significant impact on the development of EU fundamental human rights 
 protection, being recognised as a source of “guidelines” for the ECJ when deter-
mining which fundamental human rights form part of the general principles of 
EU law and how these must be interpreted.76 In addition, it plays a crucial role 
in the interpretation of the EUCFR, as article 52(3) of the latter provides that 
“in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
 Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention. THis provision shall not prevent Union law provid-
ing more extensive protection.”
Given that there have been no ECJ rulings dealing with the parental rights of 
same-sex couples, and since the ECHR plays a crucial role in the development 
of EU fundamental human rights protection and – in fact – constitutes a “floor” 
of the protection offered at EU level, it is obvious that the arguments made in 
the previous section, where the parenting rights of same-sex couples were explored 
in the ECHR context, can be transposed here.
As noted earlier, the ECtHR held in Gas and Dubois v. France that a same-sex 
couple and their child(ren) can together enjoy “family life”, within the meaning 
of article 8 ECHR.77 Taking into account article 52(3) EUCFR seen above, the 
same interpretation must be followed for the purposes of article 7 EUCFR, which 
provides the right to private and family life in the EU context, and for the right 
to private and family life as a general principle of EU law. Hence, for the purposes 
of EU law, in situations where the child in a rainbow family has established de 
facto “family ties” with both of his/her parents, it is undisputed that family life 
exists between the members of the family, and, a fortiori, this is the case when 
those family ties have, already, been legally recognised somewhere.
EU law cannot apply in purely internal situations, i.e. situations which are 
confined to one EU member state and which have no connection with EU 
policies.78 Accordingly, “static” same-sex couples who have not exercised their 
EU free movement rights cannot rely on EU fundamental human rights protec-
tion to require their own EU member state to legally recognise them as the joint 
parents of their children, and this is so even when that member state discriminates 
against them on the ground of their sexual orientation (though, since all EU 
member states are signatories to the ECHR, they will – as seen in the previous 
section – be able to rely on the ECHR to challenge this).
On the other hand, if a same-sex couple who moves between EU member 
states is faced in the host member state with a refusal to legally recognise a parent-
child relationship established elsewhere, the situation clearly falls within the scope 
of EU law since there is an exercise of and a restriction on (as explained in the 
76 Case 4/73 Nold ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.
77 Gas and Dubois (n. 20) para 37.
78 A. Tryfonidou: Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, Alpen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, Law Inter-
national, 2009, chapters 1 and 2.
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previous sub-section) EU free movement rights. If the principles established in 
Wagner v. Luxembourg and Mennesson v. France cases are transposed in this context, 
rainbow families can claim that the host EU member state is in breach of their 
right to private and family life (as is protected under article 7 EUCFR and as 
a general principle of EU law) as a result of refusing to pursue the cross-border 
continuity of the family ties among the members of the family, as these have been 
legally established elsewhere. What is more, such a reading of the right to family 
life seems to be in line with ECJ pronouncements where the court emphasised 
the importance of ensuring that member state nationals who move between EU 
member states can continue to lead a normal family life in the host member state.79
4. Conclusion
THis article had as its aim to explore the stance of European law – namely, EU 
law and the law stemming from the Council of Europe’s ECHR – on the parent-
ing rights of same-sex couples. It has been explained that both organisations 
(the EU and the Council of Europe) lack competence in the area of family law 
and, for this reason, their member states are free to decide issues that fall within 
this field. Accordingly, each member state is free to decide whether it will open 
marriage or any other relationship status to same-sex couples and – most impor-
tantly for our purposes – whether it will allow same-sex couples to become 
de facto parents who are legally recognised as the joint parents of their children. 
In the ECHR context this, nonetheless, comes with the proviso that although 
member states are free to determine which categories of persons/couples can 
“found a family” by having a child, nonetheless, when they do so they must not 
discriminate on any of the grounds included in the article 14 ECHR list, which 
include sexual orientation.
On the other hand, in cross-border situations which involve a same-sex couple 
asking a member state to legally recognise the familial links between the child 
and both parents, as these have already been established in another country, both 
the ECHR and EU law can assist. Although no case-law involving rainbow 
families where this issue emerged has been heard, to date, by either the ECtHR 
or the ECJ, it is clear that under both legal systems the refusal of a member state 
to allow the cross-border continuity, in law, of the parent-child relationship can 
amount to a breach of a number of provisions. As a human rights instrument, 
the ECHR is breached as a result of such a refusal since a violation of the right 
to private and family life of the parents and the children ensues in such a scenario; 
this can be relied on alone or together with the prohibition of discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation in the enjoyment of this right. Similarly, in the 
EU context, the same human rights-based argument can be made, but an addi-
tional – functional – argument can be put forward as well, to the effect that 
79 See, inter alia, Case C-127/09 Metock and Others ECLI:EU:C:2008:449, para 62; Coman 
(n. 60) para 32; Case C-165/16 Lounes ECLI:EU:C:2017:862, para 52. 
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the contested refusal can restrict the exercise of the free movement rights that 
member state nationals derive from EU law.
Accordingly, despite the limited competence that the EU and the Council of 
Europe have in the family law field, EU law and the ECHR can be relied on by 
same-sex couples to eradicate discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation 
as regards the enjoyment of the right to found a family (ECHR) and to require 
member states to ensure the cross-border continuity of the legal ties between 
a child and both of his/her same-sex parents, as these have been established else-
where (ECHR and EU law).
Summary  
THe Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples under European Law
Few issues incite as much controversy in contemporary law and politics as the recog-
nition and protection of the rights of sexual minorities. THe legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships, in particular, has, in the last couple of decades, become one of the most 
prominent issues discussed in parliaments, in courts, and in the media around the world. 
A much more controversial issue, nonetheless, is parenting by same-sex couples, with the 
important legal question being whether, under a specific legal system, same-sex couples 
can be legally recognised as the joint parents of a child. THe article explores this question 
from the point of view of European law in two sections, the first considering the Council 
of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights and the second European Union 
law. In both instances, the European directives do not claim competence over family law 
in the European member states. In the first, states are free to establish laws regulating 
families, with the important proviso that all people must be treated equally, with no 
discrimination, including discrimination based on sexual orientation. Countries are not 
obliged to recognize same-sex unions nor same-sex parenting rights, so long as these are 
in line with practices for heterosexual couples. A similar situation exists in European 
Union law. However, both regulating bodies can and do enforce the recognition of the 
home country’s decisions by host countries of Europeans who move to a different country. 
In EU law, this comes under the freedom of movement provision. All of this means that 
lack of guidance at the European level allows that the parental rights that same-sex  couples 
enjoy at national level vary considerably throughout Europe. However, the article shows 
that the cross-national provisions establish a legal principle that pushes towards an equal-
ization of family law in regard to same-sex couples, motivated by those who establish 
residence in one country, already having their rights legally recognized in another.
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